Hybrid warfare has evolved far beyond traditional battlefields. In today’s conflicts, drones, cyber operations, and psychological manipulation blend into a potent mix that blurs the line between peace and war.
While much public attention focuses on drones striking tanks or radar stations, an underexamined threat looms: nuclear power plants and nuclear waste depots. These facilities—symbols of both technological mastery and vulnerability—have become attractive targets in the logic of hybrid conflict.
Why nuclear sites are uniquely vulnerable
Nuclear power plants are complex, interdependent ecosystems. They rely on precise, continuous cooling, external electricity supply, and redundant safety systems. Any disturbance—whether physical, electronic, or psychological—can have cascading effects.
But hybrid warfare targets not only reactors. Across Europe and the world, thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel are stored in interim depots—often outdoors, in dry casks or surface facilities protected primarily by fencing and surveillance cameras. These depots are far less hardened than reactor containments and can become soft targets in a drone-enabled conflict.
Key vulnerabilities
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Physical sabotage of soft targets
Drones carrying small explosive payloads can damage transformers, auxiliary pumps, or cask lids. Even a superficial hit may trigger emergency procedures and public alarm. -
Reconnaissance and mapping
Small drones can gather high-resolution visual, infrared, and electromagnetic data from restricted zones—information later exploitable in cyber or kinetic attacks. -
Cyber-bridging via drone infiltration
Drones can drop infected devices or create temporary rogue Wi-Fi access points near industrial control systems (ICS/SCADA), circumventing air-gapped networks. -
Radiological sabotage of waste depots
A deliberate fire or impact on a dry-cask field could release radioactive particles, without even touching a reactor. The result: contamination, evacuation, and long-term loss of confidence. -
Psychological warfare
The mere perception of a drone attack against nuclear sites can sow fear, force costly shutdowns, and feed disinformation campaigns. Hybrid actors exploit this psychological leverage for strategic gain.
Hybrid warfare amplifies the risk
Drone-enabled hybrid warfare combines four asymmetries:
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Low cost, high impact: a consumer drone costing €1,000 can trigger millions in countermeasures.
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Anonymity: attackers can operate from civilian areas or use autonomous swarms, obscuring attribution.
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Information fusion: physical attacks often coincide with cyber operations and social media manipulation.
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Psychological resonance: nuclear energy already evokes fear; attackers use that to destabilize societies.
This is why nuclear infrastructure—and even non-critical waste depots—can become prime leverage points in a hybrid campaign.
Documented incidents highlight the trend
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France (2014–2015): Over 30 unidentified drone flights over EDF nuclear plants prompted investigations by the Gendarmerie du nucléaire et des matières sensibles.
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Belgium (2016): Following terror arrests, security footage revealed attempts to surveil a nuclear scientist involved in reactor operations.
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Ukraine (2022–2025): Drone strikes and overflights near Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl showed how nuclear sites become embedded in broader military operations.
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Japan and U.S.: Both have reported unauthorized drone incursions into nuclear airspace, leading to stricter low-altitude restrictions and C-UAS deployments.
These cases confirm what researchers such as Zoltán Bebesi and Zsolt Jurás (2023) highlight in their paper Relevant Tasks for UAV Protection Systems in Relation to the Aerial Scenario of Nuclear Facilities:
“Small UAVs extend the perimeter of vulnerability beyond fences and domes, requiring a layered detection and response architecture.”
Countering the threat: technology, policy, and grid resilience
1. Strengthen perimeter and aerial defense
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Deploy multi-modal C-UAS systems that combine radar, RF, optical, and acoustic sensing for small-drone detection.
(See: Wang et al., “Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems: State of the Art,” (2020)). -
Use AI-based classification to distinguish hostile drones from harmless overflights, avoiding constant false alarms.
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Employ non-kinetic neutralization (RF takeover, GPS spoofing) to prevent debris or explosive fragments from falling on sensitive areas.
2. Protect nuclear waste depots
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Relocate interim storage facilities into hardened, partially buried bunkers or install impact-resistant domes.
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Equip depots with dedicated drone surveillance zones and redundant containment layers.
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Integrate radiation-tolerant sensors for immediate detection of structural breaches or thermal anomalies.
3. Secure and segment cyber-physical systems
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Isolate SCADA networks with hardware-based data diodes.
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Employ drone intrusion simulation exercises to train operators in hybrid incident response.
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Expand interagency drills that combine cyber, physical, and emergency-response units.
4. Build a resilient, decentralized energy grid
Ultimately, resilience is systemic. A society that depends on a few centralized reactors is more vulnerable than one with a distributed, multi-source grid.
Hybrid warfare teaches a simple lesson: don’t put all your electrons in one basket.
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Decentralize generation: integrate solar, wind and microgrids that can island themselves from the main network.
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Diversify energy types: pairing renewables with hydrogen, hydro, and advanced storage reduces single-point failure risk.
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Use smart grid coordination: AI-driven balancing and regional autonomy can maintain supply even if part of the network is attacked or isolated.
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Enhance energy diplomacy: shared European or regional grid interconnections offer redundancy and collective deterrence.
Academic work from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2023) and the World Nuclear Association both emphasize that “decentralization and diversification strengthen national energy resilience against hybrid and cyber threats.”
Policy implications for defense and civil aviation sectors
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Treat nuclear and waste facilities as hybrid targets.
Integrate them into national threat models alongside power grids, telecoms, and water systems. -
Mandate regular C-UAS audits.
Regulators should require licensed nuclear operators to demonstrate drone-defense readiness and interagency coordination. -
Promote public transparency.
Hiding incidents fosters mistrust; communicating response capability builds deterrence and resilience. -
Invest jointly in dual-use technologies.
Radar and RF sensors developed for civil aviation surveillance (like SkyRadar’s FreeScopes and SkySMC) can also monitor and analyze drone intrusions at critical infrastructure. -
Plan for layered resilience.
Combine defense (C-UAS and hardening) with strategic decentralization of energy—so that even if one plant is compromised, the nation’s lights stay on.
Lessons Learnt
Drone-based hybrid warfare has exposed the Achilles heel of modern energy infrastructure. Nuclear power plants and waste depots, while designed for internal safety, were never conceived as battlefield nodes in a gray-zone war.
Defending them now requires a dual strategy:
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Immediate protection through detection, electronic countermeasures, and interagency coordination.
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Long-term resilience through a decentralized, multi-source energy system that reduces dependency on any single high-value site.
As hybrid warfare blurs the boundary between civilian and military spheres, energy security becomes national security. And in this new landscape, the radar and surveillance technologies developed for airspace safety can become the guardians of nuclear peace.
References
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Zoltán Bebesi and Zsolt Jurás (2023) Tasks for UAV Protection Systems in Relation to the Aerial Scenario of Nuclear Facilities. In: Science & Military 2023 18(1):39-44
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Wang, J., et al. (2020). Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems: State of the Art, Challenges and Future Trends.
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HARVARD Kennedy School, Belfer Center (2024). The Risks and Rewards of Emerging Technology in Nuclear Security. Nuclear Threat Initiative.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (2024). Assessment on Emerging Technologies and Threats in Nuclear Security
