Urban combat at Pokrowsk shows how drones and ground forces converge. The following article provides a technical look at their interaction, resilience, and EW implications.
Understanding a new interaction between manned and unmanned systems
When Christian Mölling and András Rácz described the Russian advance on Pokrowsk in November 2025, they highlighted a pattern that reveals how deeply drones have become integrated into the logic of ground combat. According to their analysis, Russian units used the ruins of the city as cover, combining artillery, loitering munitions, and ambushes to neutralise Ukrainian drone teams. By directly targeting these teams, they forced surviving Ukrainian operators to work from greater distances, weakening the immediate aerial support available to defending infantry.
The tactic was as much psychological as technical: it re-established the initiative on the ground by constraining the enemy’s capacity to see, react, and strike in real time. Mölling and Rácz thus captured a broader transformation of warfare. What once appeared to be a contest between drone fleets has become an intertwined struggle between human troops and robotic extensions—each side probing not only physical terrain but the electromagnetic spectrum and data networks that sustain tactical vision.
From an engineering perspective, the Pokrowsk case is a demonstration of system interdependence. Victory did not arise from superior machinery alone but from how different layers—soldiers, sensors, software, and command loops—were synchronized or disrupted.
The strategic and analytical frame
Hendrik Remmel’s recent study at the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies helps explain why such tactical developments have strategic resonance. His analysis of geostrategic behaviour during the Ukraine war emphasises how operational outcomes feed back into political decision-making. The recurring hesitation to withdraw from untenable positions, he argues, stems partly from symbolic imperatives to hold ground and from public expectations shaped by the information war.
For engineers and defense technologists, this linkage matters. It reminds us that the effectiveness of new systems depends not only on hardware resilience or signal integrity but also on how information produced by those systems is interpreted and acted upon by commanders. Timely, reliable situational awareness can shorten the political–military decision cycle and prevent avoidable losses.
Categories of drone–ground interaction
A review of current academic work—including studies by Daniela Kunertová, Matteo Sguotti, and analyses in Revue Défense Nationale—suggests that drone–ground interaction now falls into several distinct, but overlapping categories. Each category carries specific implications for electronic warfare, communication technology, and systems engineering.
1. Sensor-to-shooter enablers
Small reconnaissance drones shorten the distance between detection and engagement. By transmitting precise coordinates to artillery and mortar units, they reduce munition expenditure and improve responsiveness.
Engineering implications: ultra-low latency links, adaptive image compression, and secure C2 integration.
EW response: frequency-agile jamming and autonomous fallback modes are required to sustain connectivity when the spectrum becomes contested.
2. Loitering and FPV attack drones
Low-cost, first-person-view (FPV) drones function as precision munitions against trenches, vehicles, or even individual soldiers.
Engineering implications: standardized payload interfaces, rapid reprogramming, and anti-spoofing navigation.
EW countermeasures: localized signal denial, visual decoys, and multi-sensor perimeter defenses.
3. Suppression of enemy drone teams
The Pokrowsk case illustrates this category most clearly. By ambushing drone operators, Russian troops limited Ukraine’s local aerial reconnaissance.
Engineering implications: protective concealment of UAS launch points, mobile data relays, and emission control.
EW response: directional detection of operator emissions and hardened communication networks.
4. Persistent area denial
Medium-range loitering munitions and long-endurance UAS create a hovering threat that restricts movement and strains air defense resources.
Engineering implications: multispectral detection combining radar, infrared, and SIGINT; automated prioritization in target selection.
EW response: layered jamming with adaptable power control to avoid self-interference.
5. Resilient communications
As the spectrum becomes crowded, engineers are exploring alternatives to traditional radio frequency links. Three approaches stand out:
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Mesh networks that reroute data through multiple nodes, maintaining control even when individual drones are jammed.
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Tethered or fibre-optic systems, already observed in the field, which bypass the electromagnetic spectrum entirely at the cost of mobility.
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Laser-based optical communication, now emerging as a promising solution. Line-of-sight laser datalinks offer high bandwidth, resistance to RF interference, and low probability of detection. They also complicate electronic interception, as the beam is narrowly confined. For training and defense development, laser-based communications represent a critical test field—requiring precise alignment, adaptive optics, and safety protocols to prevent collateral exposure.
EW implications: traditional jamming becomes ineffective against optical channels, shifting emphasis to physical obstruction, atmospheric interference, or hybrid detection combining optical and thermal sensors.
6. Information and deception operations
In an environment saturated with sensors, deception regains importance. Decoy heat sources, false radio traffic, and radar reflectors are used to mislead opposing drones.
Engineering implications: the need for multi-sensor fusion and data-provenance verification to filter out manipulated inputs.
Lessons for engineers and electronic-warfare developers
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Integration outweighs individual performance. The decisive factor in drone-supported operations is the speed and reliability of the data path from sensor to decision. Radar, optical, and electronic-support sensors must be unified under modular C2 frameworks with defined latency budgets.
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Adaptation cycles are accelerating. On the Ukrainian battlefield, new drone tactics often appear and are countered within weeks. Technical architectures must therefore be modular, software-defined, and updateable in the field. Long procurement cycles risk delivering obsolescent solutions.
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Resilience must include redundancy. Mesh routing, optical links, and autonomous fallback modes should coexist rather than compete. No single technology will remain unjammed indefinitely; hybrid connectivity is the only sustainable answer.
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EW is shifting toward precision. The mass use of micro-UAS demands localized, selective electronic effects rather than broad-band denial. Systems that can discriminate between friendly, neutral, and hostile emitters at metre-level accuracy are becoming essential.
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Human factors remain decisive. Technology amplifies the situational awareness of commanders but cannot substitute for strategic judgement. As Remmel observed, delayed decisions to withdraw can nullify even the most advanced equipment. Engineers must therefore design interfaces and data displays that clarify rather than overwhelm decision-makers.
A technology-driven interpretation
From the standpoint of defense technology rather than military doctrine, the Pokrowsk events represent an inflection point. Drone warfare has evolved beyond the isolated duel between aerial platforms. It is now a systemic competition—one that rewards integration across domains, rapid adaptation, and resilience in communication.
For the radar and EW community, this transformation offers both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge lies in designing systems that remain effective amid interference, deception, and attrition. The opportunity lies in providing the enabling layer of perception and communication that determines how quickly a force can learn, adapt, and survive.
As small drones continue to merge with the movements of ground troops, the focus of innovation shifts from single systems to entire adaptive networks—networks that can sense, decide, and act even when traditional communication is denied. Laser-based and hybrid optical-RF communications, modular EW architectures, and resilient signal-processing chains are likely to define the next phase of this contest.
Pokrowsk, in that sense, is less an isolated episode than a preview of the coming convergence between electronics, software, and the human element in modern warfare—a convergence that engineers, not only soldiers, will increasingly shape. It also illustrates how rapid, SME-driven platform innovation, fueled by accessible components and open engineering ecosystems, is beginning to redefine the pace at which new capabilities emerge and are fielded, often faster than traditional procurement cycles can absorb.
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References
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Kunertová, D. (2023). Drones have boots: Learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine. ETH Zurich: Center for Security Studies.
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Mölling, C. and Rácz, A. (2025). Pokrowsk vor dem Fall: Ukraine kann Blatt nicht wenden. ZDF Analysis, 7 November 2025.
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Remmel, H. (2024). Die USA als geostrategischen Akteur im Ukrainekrieg verstehen. GIDS Research 1/2024. Hamburg: German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies.
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Sguotti, M. (2024). The Use of Drones in the Russia-Ukraine War: A new way of warfare and an international right dilemma. ResearchGate, September 2024.
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Vallée, J.-L. (2023). The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Current and Future Conflicts. Revue Défense Nationale, Hors-Série 2 (2023), pp. 95–103.
