AAE Opinion No. 18, “Collaborative Air and Space Combat Operations in Europe” calls for collaborative air and space combat structures in Europe; this article examines its implications and outlines a platform-based C4ISR response.
In AAE Opinion No. 18, the Académie de l’Air et de l’Espace (AAE) in association with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Luft-und Raumfahrtechnik (DGLR) the sets out a structured argument for rethinking Europe’s approach to air and space power. The document identifies the growing complexity of multi-domain operations, the compression of decision cycles, and the strategic consequences of fragmented national capabilities. It argues that future effectiveness will depend less on the incremental improvement of individual platforms and more on the integration of systems into coherent, shared operational architectures (Full text available under this link).
Collaborative Air and Space Combat Operations in Europe
The Opinion situates its analysis within a rapidly evolving strategic context. Air and space operations are no longer separable domains; they are tightly interwoven with cyber, electromagnetic and information environments. Surveillance, targeting, communication and command functions increasingly rely on distributed sensors and networked data flows. In such an environment, fragmentation — whether technical, doctrinal or industrial — translates directly into operational vulnerability. The document therefore calls for European states to move beyond loosely aligned national systems toward structurally integrated approaches.
A central theme of the Opinion is the shift from coordination to collaboration. Traditional cooperation models allow states to retain sovereign control over assets while aligning activities where possible. However, the Opinion suggests that this model may prove insufficient in high-intensity scenarios requiring near-instantaneous data fusion and cross-domain decision-making. Collaborative operations, in contrast, presuppose shared standards, interoperable architectures and jointly developed capabilities that are conceived from the outset to function within a common framework.
The text also emphasises industrial and technological dimensions. It notes that Europe’s defence-industrial landscape remains marked by duplication, limited interoperability and vendor-specific ecosystems. Without common reference architectures and shared technological baselines, innovation risks remaining compartmentalised. The Opinion therefore implicitly links operational effectiveness with industrial integration, suggesting that collaborative combat operations require corresponding collaboration in research, development and procurement.
Another important strand of the document concerns sovereignty. While European nations seek strategic autonomy, the Opinion recognises that autonomy cannot be achieved through isolation. Rather, it must be built on interoperable European capabilities capable of acting collectively when necessary. This entails not only shared operational doctrines but also secure, resilient data infrastructures and common technological standards that reduce structural dependence while enabling scale.
In summary, AAE Opinion No. 18 frames collaborative air and space combat operations as both a military and systemic requirement. It identifies fragmentation as a strategic liability and proposes deeper integration — doctrinal, technological and industrial — as the path toward credible European capability in a contested and accelerated security environment.
Personal Position - Discussing the Opinion Paper (from a Technical Standpoint)
Building on the reasoning outlined in AAE Opinion No. 18, I fully support the transition from cooperative to genuinely collaborative European defence structures.
From a technical standpoint, collaboration requires a platform concept — not a physical platform, but a federated digital architecture — through which data from heterogeneous surveillance and sensor systems can be aggregated, structured and made available for coordinated C4ISR operations. Without systematic cross-system data integration, AI-enabled situational awareness and rapid real-time defence will remain structurally limited. Data aggregation is the prerequisite for scalable, software-defined capabilities that can evolve alongside emerging threats.
Such a platform-based approach aligns closely with the objectives of the STEP Regulation: strengthening Europe’s long-term technological and industrial capacity, reducing fragmentation, shortening innovation-to-deployment cycles and reinforcing technological sovereignty. In defence terms, this means prioritising interoperable, software-defined and data-driven systems that allow continuous upgrades, integrate contributions from SMEs and research institutions, and remain resilient without structural dependence on non-European technologies.
It is understandable that established defence incumbents may hesitate to move beyond vendor lock-in environments that have historically secured market positions. Yet experience from the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in the 1990s and regulatory reforms in financial services, including PSD2, demonstrates that structured market opening can stimulate innovation and efficiency while preserving strategic control.
Given current geopolitical pressures and uncertainties in transatlantic cooperation, Europe must act with coherence and speed. National sensitivities and corporate particularisms risk delaying decisions that require collective resolve. An empowered central procurement and standardisation authority — for example within the framework of the MPCC — could define reference architectures and align procurement accordingly, thereby creating predictable standards and economies of scale.
In the longer term, such an approach could contribute to a more integrated European pillar within NATO: a coalition of like-minded democratic states committed to strengthening defence effectiveness while reducing redundancy and financial inefficiencies. The objective is not centralisation for its own sake, but the establishment of a structured, interoperable and evolvable ecosystem capable of delivering credible and sovereign European defence capabilities.
Dr. Scholten thanks Bruno Depardon for starting the discussion and for co-authoring the opinion paper.
References
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Académie de l’Air et de l’Espace (AAE) (2026) Collaborative Air and Space Combat Operations in Europe. AAE Opinion No. 18. Toulouse: Académie de l’Air et de l’Espace. Available at: https://academieairespace.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/AAE_int_Avis18_Uk_WEB.pdf (Accessed: 17 February 2026).
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Scholten, U. (2025) ‘Platform-Based Innovation: Scaling Adaptation Through Open Ecosystems’, SkyRadar Blog, 6 November. Available at: https://www.skyradar.com/blog/platform-based-innovation-scaling-adaptation-through-open-ecosystems (Accessed: 17 February 2026).
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Scholten, U. (2026) ‘Europe’s Military Coordination Without the U.S.: Why the Technical Problem Is ISR Integration’, SkyRadar Blog, 12 January. Available at: https://www.skyradar.com/blog/europes-military-coordination-without-the-u.s.-why-the-technical-problem-is-isr-integration (Accessed: 17 February 2026).
- Scholten, S. & Scholten, U. (2012) Platform-based innovation management: Directing external innovational efforts in platform ecosystems. Journal of the Knowledge Economy, published online June 2012.
DOI: 10.1007/s13132-011-0072-5
