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The FAA Ground Stop: Why ATM Resilience Depends on ATSEP Competence

Written by Ulrich Scholten, PhD | Nov 22, 2026

The FAA ground stop exposed critical dependencies in interconnected air traffic management systems. Why ICAO Doc 10057, cross-domain ATSEP competence and practical training are essential for ATM resilience.

A local change, a nationwide disruption

On November 13, 2026, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) imposed a nationwide ground stop lasting approximately four hours and 45 minutes. Network instability associated with router installations disrupted communications and surveillance services across much of the United States.

CNN subsequently reported concerns about contractor oversight during maintenance at a remote FAA communications facility in Arkansas. Investigators were still examining the precise cause of the disruption. [1, 2]

What makes this incident particularly significant is the apparent relationship between a relatively local technical intervention and a nationwide operational disruption.

The incident raises a fundamental question about the resilience of modern air traffic management (ATM) infrastructure: How can a local component malfunction or configuration change propagate through interconnected systems, and why do redundancy and recovery arrangements sometimes fail to contain its consequences?

Although the investigation has not established whether a single point of failure or a broader common-mode vulnerability was responsible, the incident demonstrates the importance of understanding dependencies between systems.

It also raises questions about the competencies required of the technical personnel responsible for designing, modifying, maintaining and monitoring these infrastructures.

Resilience begins before a system fails

Resilience is more than redundancy. A resilient ATM infrastructure must be able to anticipate disruptions, withstand failures, limit their propagation and restore essential services.

Redundant equipment provides little protection if supposedly independent systems share an overlooked dependency, such as a common network service, timing source, configuration mechanism or control interface.

Consequently, resilience must be considered during system architecture, procurement, integration and change management — not only after an incident.

Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEP) should have an active technical role in these processes.

Their operational experience can help identify dependencies that may not be apparent when individual subsystems are designed or procured separately.

This requires competencies extending beyond equipment maintenance: understanding network architectures, evaluating failure propagation, assessing redundancy, identifying critical dependencies and participating in technical risk assessments.

ATSEP should not be limited to maintaining architectures designed by others. They should be sufficiently qualified to contribute to decisions that determine whether those architectures are resilient.

ICAO Doc 10057: From technical knowledge to system-level competence

ICAO Doc 10057, Manual on Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel Competency-based Training and Assessment, provides a foundation for developing these capabilities.

Its competency-based approach links training to observable performance rather than theoretical knowledge alone. [3]

The existing qualification domains are particularly relevant to the FAA incident:

  • DPR (Data Processing): Understanding data flows, network dependencies, routing, information integrity and the effects of processing or communication failures.
  • COM (Communication): Understanding the infrastructure supporting aeronautical communications, redundancy and degraded operating conditions.
  • SMC (System Monitoring and Control): Monitoring interconnected systems, correlating alarms, identifying failures and supporting service restoration.

Surveillance (SUR) and Navigation (NAV) must also be considered because they depend on communication and processing infrastructure.

The challenge is that failures do not necessarily respect the boundaries between ATSEP qualification streams.

A network malfunction originating in DPR infrastructure may affect COM services, disrupt surveillance data distribution and generate alarms across multiple monitoring systems.

Training each domain in isolation cannot fully prepare personnel to understand such interactions.

Higher taxonomy levels for cross-domain competence

Cross-domain competence requires more than adding theoretical topics to existing curricula.

ATSEP involved in system architecture, integration, risk assessment or advanced fault diagnosis need learning objectives at higher cognitive taxonomy levels.

At Level 4 (Analysis), personnel should be able to analyse system interactions, distinguish between symptoms and underlying causes, and investigate how failures propagate through interconnected infrastructures.

At Level 5 (Evaluation), personnel should be able to evaluate architectural alternatives, assess resilience risks, judge the adequacy of redundancy arrangements and recommend appropriate mitigation measures.

These higher-level competencies should complement the practical skills developed during qualification and system/equipment rating training.

Not every technician requires identical expertise. However, personnel making or assessing decisions affecting critical ATM infrastructure must possess competencies appropriate to the consequences of those decisions.

The European ATSEP framework under Regulation (EU) 2017/373, Part-PERS, provides a basis for qualification, equipment-specific training and competence assessment. [5]

The important question is whether training programmes sufficiently address the increasing complexity of interconnected systems.

SWIM adds another dimension to resilience

The transition towards System Wide Information Management (SWIM), described in ICAO Doc 10039, reinforces this requirement.

SWIM promotes interoperable ATM information services through shared standards, infrastructure and governance. It enables information exchange across organisational and technical boundaries. [4]

This creates opportunities for greater operational flexibility but also introduces dependencies that must be understood and managed.

ATSEP increasingly need to consider the resilience of complete information services, rather than individual devices alone.

A service may depend on multiple network connections, data sources, processing applications and external interfaces. Understanding these dependencies is essential for assessing whether alternative paths can maintain operations during a failure.

Practical training for resilient ATM systems

Such competencies cannot be developed through theoretical instruction alone. Practical training must prepare ATSEP not only to understand system dependencies and anticipate risks, but also to respond effectively when failures occur.

Training should expose personnel to representative system failures, enabling them to investigate root causes, understand cascading effects, assess redundancy and develop recovery strategies. These exercises should address both preventive decisions during system planning and corrective actions during operational disruptions.

SkyRadar's training environment provides complementary capabilities. The CNS Trainer enables practical experiments with communication, navigation and surveillance signals, while FreeScopes supports signal processing, data analysis and the investigation of abnormal system behaviour. SkySim and Record & Replay allow trainees to study reproducible scenarios and examine the consequences of changing technical conditions.

SkySMC (System Monitoring and Control) specifically addresses operational failure management. It trains ATSEP to monitor system status, recognise alarms and abnormal conditions, diagnose faults and take appropriate corrective action to restore system functionality. This is an essential element of resilience: personnel must be able to distinguish between symptoms and root causes, respond according to operational procedures and verify that services have been successfully restored.

These capabilities can be combined with dedicated network simulation and fault-injection exercises to address cross-domain dependencies. For example, trainees could investigate how a network disruption affects connected CNS/ATM services, identify the originating fault, evaluate the effectiveness of redundancy mechanisms and determine the appropriate recovery sequence.

The educational objective is therefore threefold: anticipate and prevent failures through informed system planning, contain their operational impact when they occur, and minimise downtime through effective diagnosis and recovery.

Conclusion: Resilience requires competent people

The FAA ground stop illustrates why technical resilience cannot be achieved through equipment modernisation alone.

Reliable infrastructure requires appropriate architecture, effective oversight, well-defined operational procedures and personnel capable of understanding how systems interact.

ICAO Doc 10057 offers the competency-based foundation. Qualification and system/equipment rating programmes must translate it into cross-domain practical training, including higher-level analysis and evaluation competencies.

ATSEP must be prepared not only to repair systems after failures, but also to recognise architectural risks before those systems enter service.

Resilient ATM infrastructure begins with resilient system design — and with ATSEP qualified to understand, evaluate and maintain it.

Stay tuned

Stay connected with our ongoing publications on ATSEP qualification, CNS/ATM resilience, radar technology and practical training.

References

  1. Marsh, R. (2026, 18 November). Exclusive: 'There was no monitoring.' Sources say FAA had little oversight of work that led to nationwide ground stop. CNN. CNN investigation.
  2. Congressional Research Service (2026, 18 November). Nationwide Aircraft Ground Stop Raises Concerns over Aviation System Modernization. IN12756. CRS analysis.
  3. International Civil Aviation Organization (2020). Manual on Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEP) Competency-based Training and Assessment. ICAO Doc 10057, 2nd edition. ICAO publication.
  4. International Civil Aviation Organization. Manual on the System-wide Information Management Concept. ICAO Doc 10039. ICAO publication.
  5. European Commission (2017). Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/373. Annex XIII, Part-PERS. EU regulation.