The rapid evolution of drones in the Russia–Ukraine war has turned the battlefield into a continuous arena of experimentation, where new designs, tactics and countermeasures emerge within weeks. Recent insights from the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlight how this acceleration is reshaping Electronic Warfare and forcing militaries to rethink procurement, doctrine and training. As a continuation of our series on innovation in EW, this article explores how the frontlines have become a testing ground for adaptive systems and what this means for future defense ecosystems.
The previous article in this series (Drones, Electronic Warfare, and the New Logic of Innovation) examined how the Russia–Ukraine war reshaped the relationship between drones, surveillance and decision-making, challenging traditional models of military advantage. It suggested that the core dynamic of contemporary warfare is no longer the dominance of single platforms, but the speed at which militaries learn and adapt. The recent discussion hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on May 28,2025 deepens this picture. It shows a battlefield in which unmanned systems have moved beyond their original roles and have become instruments of continuous experimentation, organisational reform and systemic innovation (Transcript: “The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond”, or watch the video).
What stands out from the CSIS conversation is not only the scale of drone use but the diversity of their functions across air, sea and land. Ukraine’s evolution from early reliance on commercial quadcopters to the sophisticated integration of FPV systems, long-range strike drones and maritime unmanned vessels illustrates the momentum that arises when civil and military innovation cycles merge. The multiplication of low-cost airframes — millions per year — has shifted the focus from durability to attritability, marking a decisive break with the earlier era in which unmanned platforms were scarce, expensive and strategically guarded assets.
Russia’s trajectory mirrors this transformation. The transcript describes how Moscow’s pre-war emphasis on large, traditional UAVs gave way to a rapid embrace of compact ISR drones, mass-produced loitering munitions and improvised ground systems built from civilian components. Volunteer groups, startups and informal workshops now play an active role in supplying the front. The war has eroded the boundary between defense industry and civilian ingenuity, forcing Russia’s own military bureaucracy to improvise in ways it had not anticipated.
The CSIS discussion frames this shift as a collapse of traditional development cycles. Research, testing and evaluation, which once extended over years, now unfold within weeks. Battlefield commanders do not wait for doctrine to stabilise; instead, doctrine is continuously rewritten through practice. The implications for Electronic Warfare are profound. Jamming, spoofing and counter-UAS tactics evolve faster than conventional procurement can respond. Both sides confront an environment in which electronic signatures change rapidly, in which communications networks are fragile, and in which errors — such as poor coordination or incompatible systems — can lead to drone fratricide or failed intercepts.
One theme that emerges strongly from the Ukrainian experience is institutional adaptation. The country’s decision to streamline procurement and establish a dedicated unmanned systems service allowed civil innovation to flow directly into military operations. Rather than directing innovation from above, authorities shifted into an enabling role: reducing friction, creating standards, sharing frontline experience and integrating lessons into doctrine. This approach mirrors the broader pattern identified in earlier work: the advantage lies not simply in acquiring new technology, but in creating the structures that allow technology to be absorbed, modified and redeployed at speed.
The CSIS discussion also highlights an important frontier. While both sides have begun to integrate basic forms of AI — image-recognition modules, target-lock features, terminal guidance — the speakers caution that the most ambitious developments remain limited by resource constraints. The surge of creativity at the tactical edge confronts a ceiling: deeper advances require dedicated research programmes, reliable semiconductor access and longer innovation horizons. What exists now is a hybrid space in which open-source tools and commercial components are pushed to their limits, but the next leap will demand more sustained investment.
Seen from the perspective of Electronic Warfare, the war demonstrates how the battlespace has become a system of mutually adapting algorithms, sensors and countermeasures. A jamming technique introduced today may be circumvented tomorrow. A fibre-optic drone, immune to common interference, forces adversaries to revert to kinetic defenses. A swarm-like tactic prompts new radar configurations and altered rules of engagement. The tempo resembles a living laboratory, in which every innovation generates its own counter-innovation.
This logic is at the centre of SkyRadar’s exploration of platform-based defense ecosystems. Earlier articles argued that open, modular platforms allow militaries to integrate rapid technical developments into C4ISR and EW architectures without compromising reliability or security (Platform-Based Innovation).
The CSIS transcript offers empirical evidence for why such architectures are no longer optional. When unmanned systems proliferate at industrial scale, when frontline units generate their own solutions, and when adversaries react daily, militaries need environments that can absorb new sensors, new software, new threat libraries and new training requirements without restarting the entire certification chain. The frontlines in Ukraine show what happens when adaptation becomes the defining measure of military competence; platform-based innovation provides the structural means to support it.
For training organisations, this shift means preparing operators, engineers and decision-makers for a battlespace defined by constant iteration. Radar specialists must understand how small-signature targets behave; EW teams must anticipate rapidly changing interference strategies; command units must navigate a domain in which situational awareness is both essential and highly contested. A training ecosystem that supports experimentation — synthetic radar scenes, programmable EW environments, multi-domain simulations — becomes a foundational capability in its own right.
The CSIS event ultimately confirms that the drone war is not merely a technological phenomenon but a systemic one. It is a contest of learning speed, organisational flexibility and the capacity to integrate innovation under pressure. As modern conflict moves deeper into this paradigm, the alignment between operational needs and adaptive training architectures will become increasingly central. SkyRadar’s approach — rooted in modularity, openness and rapid configurability — responds directly to the conditions that now define the modern battlefield.
Stay connected with our ongoing publications on Electronic Warfare and Radar Technology.
Allen, G.C., Bondar, K. and Bendett, S. 2025. The Russia–Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. CSIS event transcript, 28 May.
Scholten, S. and Scholten, U. 2025. Platform-Based Innovation: Scaling Adaptation Through Open Ecosystems. SkyRadar, 8 November.
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