A recent GIDS report reveals a critical shift in modern warfare: from platform dominance to adaptive innovation. What the Russia-Ukraine war teaches us about electronic warfare, resilience, and how NATO must rethink defense.
This article is based on the scientific report: Based on: Nannt, S. & Remmel, H. (2024). Innovations- und Adaptionsfähigkeit als Schlüssel zum militärischen Erfolg. GIDSresearch 6/2024.
The war in Ukraine has shattered many preconceptions about modern warfare. While early narratives focused on tanks, missiles, and terrain, a deeper analysis reveals a quieter revolution: the central role of adaptation and innovation in determining strategic outcomes. In this context, Electronic Warfare (EW) has emerged not just as a support function but as a central domain of strategic maneuvering.
A recent report by the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (GIDS)—the Bundeswehr’s think tank hosted at the Führungsakademie in Hamburg—offers a piercing analysis of these dynamics. It highlights that the key to military success is no longer rooted in static force structures, but in the ability to evolve—doctrinally, technologically, and organizationally. The paper draws on extensive lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, identifying a decisive paradigm shift relevant to all NATO and EU members, especially Germany.
This article distills the GIDS findings, explains the actors involved, and discusses the implications for EW specialists and strategic planners.
The German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (GIDS) is the central research hub for the Bundeswehr on strategy, military innovation, and security policy. Located in Hamburg and staffed by experienced officers and civilian experts, GIDS provides thought leadership on defense transformation. Its reports—like the GIDSresearch 6/2024—are meant to guide strategic planning at the national and alliance level, with particular attention to technology, doctrine, and geopolitical shifts.
The Russian Federation entered the war with high confidence in its traditional strengths: shock tactics, hybrid warfare, and brute-force conventional firepower. The initial invasion plan—a blitz on Kyiv via airborne assault—was undermined by overconfidence, poor battle damage assessments, and underestimation of Ukraine’s resilience.
However, Russia quickly shifted gears. By 2023, it had adopted an attritional strategy, supported by:
Mass production of modified Soviet-era systems (e.g., reactivated tanks and glide bombs)
Adaptation to Ukrainian drone warfare via rapid scaling of domestic drone production
Improved EW capabilities that severely degraded Western-supplied precision-guided munitions
Doctrinal regression to Cold War-style regimental formations better suited for high-casualty warfare
This top-down, state-coordinated adaptiveness, while not technologically avant-garde, proved effective in regaining strategic stability — but did so by deliberately absorbing very high human losses. Russia’s attrition logic prioritizes scalability and endurance over force preservation, a tradeoff enabled by its large population, centralized control, and ability to mobilize without political upheaval.
In contrast, Ukraine responded with a bottom-up, technology-centric innovation model:
Civil-military tech ecosystems like BRAVE1 integrated startups, volunteers, and national defense R&D
Commercial drone adaptation (e.g., DJI quadcopters weaponized for reconnaissance and strike)
AI-enhanced swarm concepts and tactical-level ISR capabilities
Digital tools like “Kropyva” for real-time command, control, and fire coordination
Decentralized command doctrines emphasizing initiative and flexibility
Ukraine’s innovation was fast, decentralized, and resourceful—turning off-the-shelf components and improvised solutions into strategic assets. EW was a core field of contestation: Ukrainians relied on nimble countermeasures, novel jamming techniques, and creative spectrum exploitation.
However, scaling remains a key weakness. Without industrial mass production or deep reserves, Ukraine’s gains risk being neutralized over time by Russia’s scaling of adapted capabilities.
Both sides demonstrate that static capability comparisons are less decisive than adaptive and innovative responsiveness.
In legacy thinking, warfare outcomes depended on mass, precision, or superior platforms. Today, speed of innovation loops, doctrinal flexibility, and EW resilience often decide the tempo and effectiveness of operations.
Jamming and counter-jamming evolve in weeks, not years. Systems must be software-defined and rapidly reprogrammable.
Dual-use tech is frontline reality. EW tools increasingly stem from consumer electronics or open-source ecosystems.
Resilience depends on integration of cyber, SIGINT, AI, and physical platform protection.
Innovation cycles benefit from field feedback, not just lab testing. Ukraine’s iterative battlefield upgrades are a blueprint.
Ukraine’s iterative battlefield upgrades are a blueprint for agile innovation under extreme pressure. They show how innovation cycles benefit from field feedback, not just lab testing — adapting tools, doctrine, and organization in near real-time.
Author’s note: While these battlefield innovations offer valuable strategic and operational insights, it is important to recognize the moral dilemma they embody. The most effective driver of innovation should never be live conflict. Our utmost goal must remain to prevent war, not to optimize our ability to fight it. Strategic innovation, particularly in domains like electronic warfare, should aim to serve deterrence, stability, and peace — not to normalize war as a testing ground.
The GIDS report warns that Germany is not positioned to thrive in this new paradigm:
IP remains in private hands, complicating military adoption of cutting-edge technologies.
Dual-use regulations are too rigid, slowing integration of commercial innovations.
Procurement remains centralized and sluggish, detached from real-time needs.
Military is treated as a mere customer, not a co-creator in innovation ecosystems.
In electronic warfare terms, this means Germany could struggle to field responsive countermeasures or exploit new attack vectors during a peer conflict. The traditional procurement cycle is misaligned with 21st-century EW dynamics.
From our perspective, this applies broadly across the EU—France’s innovation reforms are still incomplete, Spain grapples with dual-use complexity and fragmented procurement, and Italy suffers from weak civil–military tech transfers. EU initiatives like the EDF and EDIS signal intent—but national adoption remains slow and risk-averse.
| Issue | Germany | France | Spain | Italy | EU |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Procurement too slow | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ |
| Dual-use red tape | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ |
| Fragmented industry | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ |
| Defense–civil integration lacking | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ |
The institutional challenges identified by GIDS in Germany—rigid dual-use policy, bureaucratic procurement, and weak integration of the military into innovation ecosystems—are not unique. France, Spain, Italy, and other EU members display similar patterns: awareness of the problem is growing, yet implementation lags behind.
Startups and agile developers—especially in AI, SIGINT, jamming, and low-cost drone tech—must be structurally integrated into defense innovation.
EW capabilities should be modular, updatable, and interoperable—ideally with secure but open architectures that allow rapid reconfiguration in theater.
Decentralized experimentation units (à la Ukraine’s brigades) should be given the freedom to trial and deploy innovations under realistic conditions, enabling faster feedback loops and operational learning.
Author’s note: Ukraine’s example shows the power of empowering frontline units to innovate — but it also highlights a painful truth: war accelerates innovation in ways no peacetime lab can replicate. While we can learn from this agility, we must never lose sight of the ethical imperative: to scale innovation through structured preparedness, not through suffering. Decentralized testing and iteration should happen within simulated, ethical, and peaceful frameworks — so that we never need war to learn what works.
EW planners should account not only for Russian current capabilities, but for their likely adaptations—especially in counter-drone EW and GPS jamming.
Create doctrines and structures that anticipate change. EW strategies must be dynamic, not templated. The battlefield is now an innovation race.
The GIDS study underscores that neither Russia's brute force nor Ukraine’s ingenuity alone is sufficient to win modern wars. Victory requires a systemic ability to adapt—strategically, tactically, and technologically.
For electronic warfare practitioners, the lesson is clear: adapt or be rendered irrelevant. Investments in scalable innovation, interoperable systems, and decentralized agility are no longer optional—they are existential imperatives.
The EU countries and their allies must act now to realign their defense ecosystems for this new reality.
At SkyRadar, we believe that the ability to adapt and innovate must not depend on real-world conflict. Our mission is to support defensive democracies in building resilient, flexible capabilities — before they are tested by war. By developing software-defined platforms and AI-enhanced simulation environments, SkyRadar empowers armed forces to train, test, and iterate operational EW concepts safely and effectively.
Our systems prioritize modular, software-centered architectures that reflect the demands of 21st-century electronic warfare — where rapid updates, decentralized decision-making, and digital integration are essential. In doing so, we strive to replace battlefield improvisation with simulation-based foresight, ensuring that militaries can innovate ethically, responsibly, and in alignment with democratic values.
Ultimately, while our goal is to prevent conflict, we also recognize that a democracy unable to defend itself invites coercion. A strong, adaptive defense posture is not militaristic — it is a precondition for peace.
Stay connected with our ongoing publications on Electronic Warfare and Radar Technology.