Radio frequency interference increasingly affects aviation safety. This article links recent research to ATSEP and military training using simulation-based analysis.
Modern aviation depends on the reliable use of the radio-frequency spectrum. Communication, navigation, and surveillance systems are now so tightly coupled to digital and wireless technologies that even modest interference can have operational consequences. A recent peer-reviewed study, led by Adnan Malik, an Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel (ATSEP) and scientific researcher, provides a comprehensive examination of radio frequency interference (RFI), its mechanisms, and its implications for civil aviation systems
While the paper focuses primarily on civil aviation, its findings are equally relevant to military users, where frequency interference may not only be accidental but also intentional. This article summarises the study’s key insights and discusses their operational relevance for both ATSEP and defence communities, with particular attention to training and simulation.
The aviation radio spectrum has become increasingly congested. Legacy systems operating in VHF and UHF bands now coexist with newer technologies such as 5G networks, unmanned aerial systems, and dense Internet-of-Things deployments. Malik’s study highlights that this coexistence is not always benign. Even when systems operate in formally separated bands, interference can arise through receiver desensitisation, intermodulation products, or out-of-band emissions.
For ATSEP professionals, this reinforces an operational reality: interference is no longer limited to equipment faults or rare atmospheric phenomena. It is increasingly shaped by external spectrum users whose systems were not designed with aviation safety margins in mind. The study documents multiple real-world incidents in which navigation and communication services were degraded despite regulatory compliance on paper.
A central contribution of the paper is its structured distinction between unintentional RFI and intentional electromagnetic interference. Unintentional sources include terrestrial transmitters, poorly shielded electronics, and natural ionospheric effects. These are familiar to most ATSEP teams and are typically addressed through monitoring, maintenance, and regulatory enforcement.
More concerning is the growing prevalence of intentional interference. The paper cites recent GPS disruptions and unauthorised transmissions that disrupted airport operations. For military users, this aligns with long-standing concerns about jamming, spoofing, and electronic attack. For civil aviation, however, the study makes clear that these threats are no longer theoretical or confined to conflict zones.
The operational implication is convergence: civil and military spectrum protection challenges are increasingly similar. Systems designed only for benign electromagnetic environments may no longer be adequate.
Malik’s analysis emphasises two primary pathways through which interference enters aviation systems: front-door coupling via antennas and receivers, and back-door coupling through cabling, power lines, and structural apertures. While front-door coupling is well understood and often addressed through filtering and antenna design, back-door coupling remains harder to detect and mitigate.
For ATSEP maintenance and certification activities, this has practical consequences. Routine checks may confirm correct antenna performance while leaving vulnerabilities in grounding, shielding continuity, or cable routing unaddressed. For military platforms, the same mechanisms are exploited deliberately through high-power or wideband interference.
The study argues that mitigation strategies must therefore extend beyond classical receiver protection and include holistic electromagnetic design and validation.
One of the most discussed topics in recent years—the coexistence of 5G systems and radar altimeters—is treated in detail. Malik reviews modelling and simulation studies showing how emissions from 5G base stations can affect altimeter performance, particularly during approach and landing phases.
The key point is not that interference is inevitable, but that safety margins depend heavily on real-world deployment conditions. Simulation results alone are insufficient. Field measurements, continuous monitoring, and conservative operational assumptions remain essential.
For ATSEP users, this underlines the continued importance of conventional navigation aids and independent monitoring. For defence users, it provides a civilian analogue to familiar military practices: redundancy, diversity, and scepticism toward single-sensor dependence.
The paper surveys a wide range of tools used to detect and analyse RFI, from spectrum analysers and network analysers to UAV-based monitoring platforms. Of particular interest is the growing use of unmanned systems to localise interference sources in complex environments such as airport perimeters.
This approach offers advantages in speed and coverage, but the study also notes unresolved challenges, including airworthiness certification, data fusion, and integration with existing operational workflows. For military users, these platforms resemble established electronic support measures. For civil aviation, they represent a shift toward more proactive spectrum situational awareness.
A recurring theme in the study is the gap between theoretical mitigation strategies and operational practice. Many interference scenarios are analysed in simulations but lack systematic field validation. Malik argues for hybrid approaches that combine modelling with in-flight or on-site measurements.
For ATSEP training, this points to a need for structured experimentation at signal-processing and system-interaction level. Within the SkyRadar training context, FreeScopes Basic III and Basic IV experiments are directly aligned with these needs. They allow trainees to observe how interference mechanisms such as receiver blocking, intermodulation, and threshold shifts propagate through processing chains and affect detection stability and false alarm behaviour. These controlled experiments reflect the mechanisms described in the paper and support analytical reasoning rather than symptom-based troubleshooting.
For military users, similar experiments support preparation for contested spectrum conditions without relying on live electronic attack environments. Interference parameters can be varied systematically, enabling understanding of system resilience while avoiding exposure of sensitive configurations.
The study led by Adnan Malik makes a clear case: radio frequency interference is now a structural challenge for aviation, not an edge case. Civil and military users face increasingly similar electromagnetic environments, shaped by spectrum congestion, dual-use technologies, and the possibility of malicious interference.
For ATSEP professionals, the message is pragmatic. Existing tools and standards remain relevant, but they must be complemented by training that builds understanding of interference mechanisms and system-level interactions. Simulation-based experimentation, including FreeScopes Basic III and IV, provides a practical means to develop this understanding before incidents occur.
For defence users, the paper confirms that civilian infrastructure can no longer be assumed to operate in a neutral spectrum environment. Shared training approaches and analytical frameworks help bridge civil and military perspectives.
Ultimately, the paper argues for closer alignment between regulation, engineering, operations, and training. Real-world validation, shared data, and system-level education will be essential if aviation systems are to remain reliable in an increasingly congested and contested electromagnetic spectrum.
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Malik, A. and Rao, M. (2025). Radio Frequency Interference, Its Mitigation and Its Implications for the Civil Aviation Industry. Electronics, 14(12), 2483. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics14122483